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Abstract 
After a decade of devolution and amid uncertainties about its effects, it is timely to assess and 
reflect upon the evidence and enduring meaning of any ‘economic dividend’ of devolution in 
the UK. Taking a multi-disciplinary approach utilising institutionalist and quantitative 
methods, this paper seeks to discern the nature and extent of any ‘economic dividend’ 
through a conceptual and empirical analysis of the relationships between spatial disparities, 
spatial economic policy and decentralisation. Situating the UK experience within the 
historical context of its evolving geographical political economy, we find: i) a varied and 
uneven nature of the relationships between regional disparities, spatial economic policy and 
decentralisation that change direction during specific time periods; ii) the role of national 
economic growth is pivotal in explaining spatial disparities and the nature and extent of their 
relationship with the particular forms of spatial economic policy and decentralisation 
deployed; and, iii) there is limited evidence that any ‘economic dividend’ of devolution has 
emerged but this remains difficult to discern because its likely effects are over-ridden by the 
role of national economic growth in decisively shaping the pattern of spatial disparities and in 
determining the scope and effects of spatial economic policy and decentralisation. 
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Introduction: in Search of the ‘Economic Dividend’ of Devolution 
 
The idea of an ‘economic dividend’ has gained significant momentum in the UK and 
internationally as a powerful and persuasive argument in the politics and economics of 
decentralisation; reflecting a broader international shift from identity to economy rationales 
in contemporary forms of state modernisation and ‘rescaling’ (Lobao et al. 2009; Rodríguez-
Pose and Sandall 2008). The ‘economic dividend’ is principally articulated in terms of 
generating allocative and productive efficiencies alongside the accountability and 
participation benefits of decentralisation for decision-making and co-ordinating collective 
action in support of economic development (Rodríguez-Pose and Gill 2005). In the UK in the 
late 1990s, for example, political advocates argued for devolution in Wales to improve its 
economic performance and productivity to create more and better jobs (Davies 1999). 
Regional government in the English regions too was promoted as an ‘economic imperative’ 
to address the ‘economic deficit’ of persistent spatial disparities between London, the Greater 
South East region and the rest (Murphy and Caborn 1996).  
Yet, despite its often active political promotion, assessments of the ‘economic 
dividend’ are unclear. In the UK, the ESRC’s 6-year research programme on Devolution and 
Constitutional Change concluded that: 
 
There is little evidence to suggest that an ‘economic dividend’ should be 
expected from devolution, or has yet appeared. There is much to suggest that 
devolution – even administrative devolution in England – will lead to a 
widening of regional economic disparities, and that there is only a limited 
capacity on the part of UK government to intervene to secure UK wide 
economic balance (Jeffery 2006: 1). 
 
More than a decade on from the main constitutional and devolutionary reforms in the 
UK, it is timely to assess and reflect upon the evidence and enduring meaning of the 
‘economic dividend’ of devolution in the UK. Little research has been undertaken on this 
issue to date because it is a far from straightforward task, given the view that its impacts are 
“likely to be complex, subtle and difficult to measure” (Jeffery 2006: 1). Problems include: 
the development of appropriate proxies relevant to particular national contexts; assembling 
available data of appropriate quality, historical coverage and international comparability; 
disentangling and isolating the effects of decentralisation; and, attributing causation amongst 
decentralisation’s myriad relationships with broader economic and institutional change 
(Ashcroft et al. 2005; McGregor and Swales 2005). Despite such challenges, the need to 
examine the evidence is pressing because it is recognised that “weakly supported” and 
“optimistic claims” for any ‘economic dividend’:  
 
…drew heavily on academic research on a ‘new’ economic regionalism which 
was perhaps too quick to draw generalisations from a combination of 
ambitious theory and a narrow range of case studies. More recently 
researchers have been more sanguine, balancing their initial optimism with a 
fuller consideration of the constraints on improved economic performance and 
on the negative economic impacts that devolution could bring (Jeffery 2006: 
1).  
 
The situation in Wales is illustrative of the resonance and inconclusive status of the 
issue. Accepting that it was the “dirty little secret” of devolution debates, the former Chair of 
the Yes Campaign in Wales acknowledged the lack of a necessary and directly causal 
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connection between decentralisation and economic development and its geographical 
unevenness: “In fact…all the important economic indicators in Wales are going the wrong 
way. You could say there has been an economic dividend for Cardiff, but not beyond 
that…The Labour Government has assumed that devolution is the recipe for economic 
development, but in fact it’s just one of the ingredients” (Kevin Morgan, Cardiff University, 
cited in Hayman 2008: 1). Further studies are required, then, especially given that while the 
economic benefits of decentralisation are “widely accepted amongst governments and 
international organisations alike, the empirical proof for this proposition remains scant” 
(Rodríguez-Pose et al. 2009: 2041; see also Ballaguer-Coll et al. 2010). 
The approach taken here is multi-disciplinary, encompassing Economic and Political 
Geography, Local and Regional Development and Political Science. It utilises a 
geographically political economy that seeks to embed its institutionalist and quantitative 
analysis in its appropriate context of the unfolding histories of institutional, political and 
economic change over time and space within the particularity of the UK state. The argument 
is that analysis of any ‘economic dividend’ of devolution in the present needs to be rooted in 
the past evolutions of spatial disparities, spatial economic policy and decentralisation within 
the political-economies of particular nation states. The historical dimension of the analysis is 
critical in understanding the path dependencies that shape the evolution of institutional 
structures and policy approaches over time and space, reflecting legacies of political choices, 
strategies and struggles.  
With the aim of assessing and reflecting upon the evidence and enduring meaning of 
the ‘economic dividend’ of devolution in the UK over a decade after the institutional and 
political reforms introduced from 1997, the paper first addresses some conceptual issues in 
considering the relationships between spatial disparities, spatial economic policy and 
decentralisation. Second, the historical context and unfolding of the UK experience is 
outlined. Third, given the constraints of comparable data availability, the analysis focuses 
upon the period 1984-2007 in an attempt to discern the existence (or otherwise), extent and 
nature of any ‘economic dividend’ arising from the inter-relation of spatial disparities, spatial 
economic policy and devolution in the UK. Last, some conclusions and reflections are 
provided.  
 
 
Spatial Disparities, Spatial Economic Policy and Decentralisation 
 
Given its complex and unclear inter-relationships, one approach is to situate the consideration 
of any ‘economic dividend’ arising from devolution within an understanding of the changing 
relations between spatial disparities, spatial economic policy and decentralisation. An 
evolution is evident in the ways in which spatial disparities are understood and explained 
with implications for how spatial economic policy and decentralisation are formulated and 
unfolded. We discern stylised kinds of approaches – redistributive, free-market and growth-
oriented – with different characteristics concerning their economic theory, causal explanation 
of spatial disparities, adjustment process, policy rationales and instruments, institutional 
organisation, geographical focus and scope, political-economic project and language (Table 
1) (see also OECD 2009). Spatial economic policy is seen as forms of economic policy with 
spatial intent – such as regional or urban policy. We recognise the need and difficulty of 
disentangling this from economic policy without explicit spatial intent but with spatial 
implications – such as macro-economic, welfare or defence policy. We acknowledge too the 
more recent debates about ‘spatially neutral’ or ‘blind’ policy that is focused upon ‘people’ 
rather than ‘place’ and explains spatial disparity as the compositional outcome of sorting 
processes driven by rational economic agents (see, for example, Overman 2010).  
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Such transitions in spatial economic policy and its organisation reflect developments 
within economic theory and their differing causal explanations for spatial disparities and 
views of adjustment processes. Such conceptual and theoretical ideas are then mediated and 
translated into policy rationales and instruments within the institutional structures of 
particular national political economies (Pike and Tomaney 2009). Uneven, partial and messy 
transitions, overlaps and struggles undoubtedly mark the political economy of such shifts that 
play out in different ways in different national contexts. Indeed, part of the aim of this paper 
is to outline how this process has unfolded in the particular context of the UK. 
Integrally related to the changes in how spatial disparities are interpreted and spatial 
economic policy formulated is a marked shift in the geographical scale and level of 
institutional organisation, delivery and governance from centralisation toward varied forms of 
decentralisation. Indeed, it is critical to recognise that devolution is only one particular form 
of decentralisation and itself comes in different shapes and sizes, driven top-down and/or 
bottom-up by different levels of state and non-state actors, and with differing motivations and 
expectations (Rodríguez-Pose and Gill 2005; Torrisi et al. 2010). Table 2 outlines the main 
types which vary in their degree of autonomy in fiscal and functional terms, balance of 
reserved and decentralised powers and responsibilities, and administrative and/or democratic 
accountability. In emphasising the importance of historical context and evolution of national 
political economies, it is evident that as a ‘new state spatiality’ decentralisation will be highly 
variegated in different nation states (Peck and Theodore 2007).  
In considering whether and what any ‘economic dividend’ might mean, 
conceptualising the potential economic benefits and costs of decentralisation is central. 
Informed by the key arguments from fiscal federalism that focuses upon the vertical structure 
of the public sector and the existence of allocative and productive efficiencies and 
accountability and participation, Table 3 summarises some of the main issues. Several other 
concerns are also important to the analytical task. First, decentralisation is widely 
acknowledged as a process rather than a one-off event; there is little sense in splitting the 
analytical frame into ‘pre-’ and ‘post-’devolution periods. Indeed, understanding and 
capturing the timing and lag of any potential benefits and costs flowing from decentralisation 
has bedevilled studies to date (McGregor and Swales 2005). Second, it is important to 
distinguish the expected or likely benefits and costs of specific forms of decentralisation such 
as devolution from what are considered the unexpected, unlikely and/or somehow additional 
bonus or windfall economic implications implied by the term ‘dividend’. Last, given that 
much of the discussion of the ‘economic dividend’ to date has focused upon potential 
efficiency benefits, attention is required to the equity concerns of the distributional impacts of 
decentralisation in economic, social and geographical terms.  
While the aspiration might be to produce some kind of assessment of the overall net 
balance of economic outcomes generated from both positive and negative effects of 
devolution, the inter-relatedness of spatial disparities, spatial economic policy and 
decentralisation involved means a more finely grained and nuanced account is required. 
Analysts searching for the ‘economic dividend’ need to accept that it may or may not exist 
and that its extent and nature over time and space are likely to be highly variable and 
differentiated; reflecting potentially strong, weak and indifferent degrees of both positive and 
negative impacts as well as place-specific spill-overs from the economic into different kinds 
of political, social and cultural domains in the political economies of particular nation states 
and territories. 
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Spatial Disparities, Spatial Economic Policy and Decentralisation: The UK 
Experience 
 
Entrenched and persistent spatial disparities have marked the UK, especially since the 1930s, 
and continue to exert an enduring influence upon the national political economy, politics and 
policy (Figure 1). Significantly, traditional interpretations of spatial disparities emphasised 
the economic inefficiency (rather than benefit or dividend) of the geographic over-
concentration and centralisation of economic activities in London and the Greater South East 
(Martin 2008), hampering national economic growth because of the rapid generation of 
inflationary bottlenecks in factor markets during periods of expansion that were stymied by 
macro-economic policy before their benefits could trickle down to the peripheral regions 
(Armstrong and Taylor 2000). Informed by the new economic geography (e.g. Krugman, 
1991), more recent explanatory narratives emphasise the economic benefits and even 
dividends of spatial disparities in the UK based upon the powerful growth enhancing benefits 
of localised agglomeration in London and the Greater South East. This analysis argues that 
any spatial policy should aim to correct market failures in support of this geographic 
concentration because dilution or redistribution of its effects would be detrimental to overall 
growth and welfare (see, for example, Leunig and Swaffield 2008).   
The UK’s experience of persistent spatial disparities has configured a long history of 
spatial economic policy focused upon the regional scale, punctuated by ‘policy on’ and policy 
off’ episodes alongside ongoing, periodic scrutiny and reflection upon its principles and 
purpose (see, for example, Barlow 1940; Harrison and Hart 1993; House of Commons 1995; 
2003). Inter-war efforts focused upon addressing localised concentrations of high 
unemployment and poverty generated by industrial decline in South Wales, northern England 
and west central Scotland (Martin 1988). After 1945, post-war consensus and persistent 
cross-party support for regional policy was predicated on traditional efficiency and equity 
rationales as well as the desire for class-based national parties to avoid the emergence of 
separate territorial politics (Gordon 1990). ‘Spatial Keynesianism’ (Martin and Sunley 1997) 
marked state intervention through regional policy, focused upon investment and stimulation 
of cumulative causation and the management of aggregate demand and employment in the 
regions (Kaldor 1970). Interpreting what the influential Barlow Report (1940) called ‘over-
development’ in the South and ‘under-development’ in the North as inextricably connected, it 
relied upon a contained version of the national economy within the territorial boundaries of 
which investment and growth could be redirected from growing, richer to lagging, poorer 
regions to alleviate spatial disparities. The initial economic case for regional policy – focused 
upon correcting the inefficiencies of under-utilised resources and lack of economic 
modernisation – evolved to connect to the social case based upon ensuring economic equity 
between regions and ameliorating the hardship generated by geographically localised job 
losses especially in places acutely affected by de-industrialisation (Morgan 2006).  
Using the ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’ of investment and labour subsidies and controls, 
spatial economic policy had a regional focus on different tiers of Assisted Areas and was 
directed ‘top-down’ by national civil servants in central government. Bound to the ‘One 
Nation’ politics of the post-war settlement, this era of strong regional policy in the 1960s was 
marked by periods of fluctuating expenditure under both Conservative and Labour 
administrations prior to its high water mark in the mid-1970s (Morgan 1985; Wren 2005) 
(Figure 2). Even during the heyday of regional policy degrees of variegation in institutional 
forms were evident shaped by the particularity of the UK state and politics. Notably, for 
example, territorial development agencies were established for Wales and Scotland by the 
Labour Government to head off the nationalist electoral challenge in the mid-1970s (Halkier 
et al. 1998) and largely limited institutional change occurred outside the responsible national 
5 
 
central government department beyond the short-lived Regional Planning Councils in 
England established by the Wilson Government in 1964. 
Despite some success in job creation and economic diversification in the Assisted 
Areas (Taylor and Wren 1997), the political-economic tide turned away from Keynesianism 
and its redistributive spatial policy toward neo-liberalism following the crisis of stagflation, 
industrial strife and public fiscal imbalances during the 1970s. Characterised by de-
regulation, liberalisation and the attempted ‘rolling-back’ of the state, the UK variant led by 
Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative administrations from 1979 emphasised individual 
responsibility, free markets and enterprise which underpinned the critique and dismantling of 
regional policy during the 1980s. The turn toward neo-classical economics and the free 
market interpreted Keynesianism and regional policy as distortions and impediments to 
rational and efficient decision-making amongst economic actors. Subsidies were seen as 
economically inefficient and wasteful, causing ‘deadweight’ effects in supporting activities 
that would have occurred anyway and unable to tackle structural problems including lack of 
enterprise and innovation (Wren 2005). 
In contrast to the Keynesian emphasis upon demand, neo-classical theory emphasised 
intervention to enhance the flexibility and upgrading of the supply-side of factor markets 
such as labour skills. Structural change toward services in the UK economy favoured regions 
and localities around London and the Greater South East, sharpening the North-South Divide 
in spatial disparities (Martin 1988). Spatial economic policy under Thatcherism reduced 
spending, shrunk the map of eligible Assisted Areas, changed support from automatic to 
discretionary selectively to encourage small enterprise and the attraction of international 
inward investment flows in the context of the Single European Market (see Figure 2). 
Formerly state-owned industries such as coal, steel and shipbuilding were privatised and 
rationalised with highly damaging localised impacts (Hudson 1989). The geographical focus 
of spatial policy shifted to the urban and the institutional lead and resources were transferred 
from local government to new special purpose bodies such as Urban Development 
Corporations and Local Enterprise Agencies (Martin and Tyler 1992). Despite its liberalizing 
ethos, though, Thatcherism retained its reliance upon the highly centralised apparatus of the 
UK state – what Andrew Gamble (1994) called ‘the free economy and the strong state’ – with 
tight control over spatial policy and local government following widespread reform in 1974. 
John Major’s successor Conservative administrations continued working within the national 
central government framework and with the urban focus of spatial policy, introducing more 
competition for resources and beginning the regionalisation within England with the 
establishment of Government Offices for the Regions in 1994. 
Highly significant in considering the recent context of any ‘economic dividend’ of 
devolution, beginning with the Regional Policy Commission’s (1996) report Renewing the 
Regions produced for Labour in opposition, the UK has been in the vanguard of replacing 
what has been termed the ‘old regional policy’ with the ‘new regional policy’ (Balls and 
Healey 2001). The ‘old regional policy’ was characterized as based upon the assumption of a 
less open national economy within which growth could be redirected by state incentives from 
relatively more prosperous donor regions to disadvantaged recipient regions. This founding 
premise was supplanted by the encouragement of a more open and permeable economy 
where mobile investment operates with international horizons. Reflecting the tenets of 
growth-oriented spatial economic policy, a ‘new regional policy’ emerged based upon 
stimulating endogenous productivity growth within each region through stimulating ‘5 
drivers’ of investment, innovation, skills, enterprise and competition (HM Treasury and 
Department of Trade and Industry 2001). The ‘economic dividend’ argument has been central 
to this shift as “Centralised regional policy, the aim of which was to promote economic 
equity between the regions, has been replaced by a devolved regional policy which aims to 
promote an economic dividend within each region” (Morgan 2006: 3; emphasis added). 
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Rather than the ‘top-down’ centralism of previous ‘old regional policy’, the ‘new regional 
policy’ was ‘bottom-up’ with the Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) as new devolved 
institutions established in all regions (not just those that were lagging) entrusted with leading 
and enhancing the productivity of their regions and localities to deliver their own growth and 
prosperity and to contribute to the national economy (Fothergill 2005). The ‘economic 
dividend’ of devolution was seen as the means of redressing spatial disparities through a 
‘levelling-up’ not ‘levelling-down’ process. 
The UK’s long history as a highly centralised, multi-national ‘union state’ has shaped 
the evolution of its institutional structures in formulating and delivering spatial economic 
policy with only limited and conditional decentralisation. Variegation is evident in the UK 
state’s institutional forms, powers and resources within its nations and regions through 
cumulative administrative decentralisation to the Scottish Office (from 1885), Wales Office 
(1964), Stormont Parliament (1921) and Government Offices in the English regions (1994). 
Despite the short-lived experiment with Regional Planning Councils in England during the 
1960s and the establishment of the Welsh Development Agency (WDA) and Scottish 
Development Agency (SDA) in the mid-1970s, centralisation has marked the institutional 
arrangements for addressing spatial disparities through spatial economic policy.  
Following the programme of devolution and constitutional change from 1997, the 
geographically differentiated institutional and political legacy was effectively built upon by 
further but highly uneven democratic decentralisation, creating a multi-level, polycentric UK 
state working across several geographical scales and representing a more distributed 
landscape of political power (Morgan 2007). Despite such reforms, the UK remains highly 
centralised in comparison to other western European states (Marks et al. 2008). The new 
arrangements comprised an asymmetrical hierarchy of powers and resources ranging from the 
Parliament in Scotland, through the National Assemblies in Wales and Northern Ireland, to 
the Mayoralty and Assembly in London and, until their abolition in 2010, the Regional 
Development Agencies and indirectly elected Regional Chambers in the English regions 
(Tomaney 2000). Territorial politics have subsequently been reinvigorated and become 
evident in varying degrees of differentiation in spatial economic policy and varieties of 
institutional organisation divergent from national, largely English-regions focused 
frameworks (Adams et al. 2003). Indeed, within the devolution debates the ‘economic 
dividend’ argument was a more prominent factor in Wales and the English regions compared 
to Northern Ireland and, until 1999, Scotland (Morgan 2006). Cooke and Clifton (2005) 
identify ‘varieties of devolution’ comprising ‘visionary’ in Scotland, ‘precautionary’ in 
Wales and ‘constrained’ in Northern Ireland, evident in different approaches, strategies, 
policy programmes and institutional arrangements (see also Goodwin et al. 2002). Examples 
include the recent incorporation of the WDA into the Welsh Assembly Government, the 
reassignment of Local Enterprise Company responsibilities to local authorities within the 
Scottish Enterprise network. 
England’s size and weight within the UK – constituting some 80% of the total 
population and nearly 90% of GDP – renders considerations of governing its uneven 
development and growth important and difficult for the UK state (Morgan 2001). The 
political and institutional settlement for the English regions remained ‘unfinished business’ 
(Tomaney 2000). Given a central economic leadership role, the RDAs were established in 
1998 as “an essential first step to provide for effective, properly co-ordinated regional 
economic development… and to enable the English regions to improve their 
competitiveness” (Department of Environment 1997: 1), accountable nationally through their 
sponsoring Department and Minister and regionally through indirectly elected Regional 
Chambers. 
This modest set of changes failed to satisfy regionalist interests in the centre and 
regions, stimulating and culminating in proposals predicated upon the bolstering of the 
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existing Government Offices and, where sufficient public support was demonstrated, 
referenda on the creation of Elected Regional Assemblies (ERAs) to address the spatial 
disparities (‘the economic deficit’) and lack of accountability (‘the democratic deficit’) within 
England: 
The Government’s central economic objective is to achieve high and stable levels of 
growth and employment throughout the UK. Our overall goal of creating an inclusive society 
means that all regions and communities should have the opportunity to share in the nation’s 
prosperity. Improving the economic performance of the English regions and enabling them to 
reach their full potential will increase social justice and drive forward the UK economy as a 
whole. To achieve this goal, productivity and employment need to improve in every part of 
the country – including some under-performing areas of those regions which have historically 
had the highest growth (Cabinet Office and DTLR 2002: 17-18). 
The widely touted and anticipated ‘economic dividend’ predicated upon heightened 
autonomy, resources and political voice at the national centre was seen as a potential route to 
a step-change in economic performance capable of closing the prosperity gap with London 
and the Greater South East on a sustainable basis. Echoing the concepts we outlined earlier, 
the potential ‘economic dividend’ attached to such devolution was to be delivered through 
enhanced autonomy to design and implement policies tailored to regional and local needs 
(allocative efficiencies) and more responsive, effective and accountable governance systems 
providing decentralised institutional capacity to mobilise and shape collective action for 
developmental ends (productive efficiencies). Amidst its weak powers, the uneven 
enthusiasm as well as hostility in central government, the lack of faith in national government 
late in its second term and the broader currents of distrust in politicians and politic 
institutions, the particular form of ERAs proposed were rejected 3:1 in the sole referendum in 
North East England in late 2004 (Rallings and Thrasher 2005).  
As the territorial politics of devolution shaped the particular developments in 
Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales, the vacuum left by the faltering regionalism and 
regionalisation projects in the English regions was filled by a range of emergent spatial 
imaginaries claiming to offer an institutional fix for the persistent problem of governing 
spatially uneven development: resurgent cities and/or city-regions as motors of their regional 
economies enhancing their economic performance; localism led by local authorities capable 
of decentralised approaches to economic development; and pan-regionalisms focused upon 
cross-regional issues including housing, jobs and infrastructure in newly designated ‘Growth 
Areas’, housing market renewal areas in northern cities and the Northern Way linking RDA 
activity to close the productivity gap with London and the Greater South East across the three 
northern regions (Pike and Tomaney 2009). Following the election of the coalition 
government in 2010, debate has raged about the shift in focus toward ‘decentralisation’ and 
‘localism’ and the dismantling of the regional tier through the winding-up of the RDAs and 
the abolition of Government Offices for the Regions. While the language of ‘economic 
dividend’ and regionalism and regionalisation has been discarded, the economic rationale is 
evident to varying degrees amongst each of these emergent forms of territorial governance. 
Economic arguments too infuse the Richard (2004) and Calman Commissions (2009) 
examining the decentralisation of greater powers and resources in Wales and Scotland, 
reinforcing the evolutionary process of institutional change and emphasising its historical 
roots in the particular political economy of the UK and its territories. We can discern the 
imprint of three distinct configurations and approaches to spatial disparities, spatial economic 
policy and decentralisation – redistributive, free-market and growth-oriented – that shape the 
particular history of the evolution of the UK political economy and set the historical context 
for assessing any ‘economic dividend’ emerging from the devolution reforms introduced in 
1997. 
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An ‘Economic Dividend’ of Devolution in the UK? 
 
That ‘devolution is a process not an event’ (Davies 1999) in the words of the former 
Secretary of State for Wales has become a well worn descriptor that nonetheless characterizes 
the evolutionary and unfolding nature of decentralisation. Hence, while the analysis here is 
focused upon discerning the existence or otherwise of a ‘economic dividend’ in the UK 
following the substantive institutional changes introduced through devolution and 
constitutional change from 1997, the argument is that such changes need to be situated in the 
context of relationships between spatial disparities, spatial economic policy and 
decentralisation and reflect deep seated currents and legacies from previous eras of change. 
Our approach is based on the combined historical paths of three key elements – spatial 
disparities, spatial economic policy and decentralisation – during a period ranging from 1984 
to 2007 (local revenue data are only available for a shorter period from 1987). Building upon 
Rodríguez-Pose and Gill (2004), we simultaneously consider the historical evolution of 
spatial disparities and decentralisation but introduce a new dimension by augmenting the 
analysis with a quantitative measure of spatial economic policy. Further, given our emphasis 
upon the importance of economic growth in shaping the dynamics of the key variables, we 
investigate the implications of including the system's overall national economic performance 
in our analysis (i.e. national economic growth and national economic development). This 
issue has been identified as important in the fiscal federalism literature, for example, Oates 
(1999: 1142) suggests “it may well be that fiscal decentralisation itself has a real contribution 
to make to improved economic and political performance at different stages of development”. 
In addition, aggregate economic growth may also be considered as a proxy for allocative and 
productive efficiency (Rodriguez-Pose et al. 2009). As far as data availability allows, the 
analysis has gone back to situate more recent changes in their appropriate historical and 
economic context. 
We use the Gini index (Gini) of regional Gross Disposable Household Income 
(GDHI) per head (data from Office for National Statistics) as the proxy for spatial 
disparities1. Although the aggregate nature of data does not allow us to correct for differences 
in household composition at the single household level, we adopted a modified OECD 
equivalence scale in order to take into account regional differences in household composition 
and size generating different economies of scale. More precisely, the following  formula 
consisting of the ratio between aggregate income earned by households resident in region j 
( ௧ܻ
௝) and a measure of aggregate population taking into account, as mentioned, differences in 
household size and composition across regions (ܵ௧
௝)    
 
 
ܪ௧
௝ ൌ ௧ܻ
௝
ܵ௧
௝  
 
eq.(1)
 
has been applied in order to compute per head values of GDHI in region “j” (ܪ௧
௝). The final 
step consisted of computing the Gini index of ܪ௧
௝ across the “R” regions, by year, according 
to the formula 
                                                 
1 The choice of GDHI per head as our dependent variable is not trivial and has important implications. The 
choice of regional gross disposable income per capita over the Gini index of GDP per capita has the advantage 
of including transfers of income from individuals, companies and government in the form, for example, of social 
benefits (European Commission, 1999). But, on the other hand, “a region that has a low level of production 
might have a relatively high level of income due to large social security transfers, but it would still be a less 
favoured region” (European Commission 2004: 25-26).  
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ܩ൫ܪ௝൯ ൌ
∑ ሺߩ௝ െ ݍ௝ሻ
ோିଵ
௝ୀଵ
∑ ሺߩ௝ሻோିଵ௝ୀଵ
 eq. (2)
 
where ߩ௝ ൌ
௝
ோ
 and ݍ௝ ൌ
ுభାுమାڮାுೕ
∑ ுೕೃೕసభ
, with ܪ௝ ൑ ܪ௝ାଵ (i.e. ܪ is non-decreasing ordered). The 
complete procedure, including GDHI components and computation, as well as the following 
measure of policy, is described in detail in Appendix 1.  
Given that all measures of fiscal policy have their own regional bias (Short 1981; 
Armstrong and Taylor 2000), for spatial economic policy we use a proxy of policy (Policy) 
reflecting direct intervention on income. This consists of the difference between the Gini 
index calculated on primary household income per head – therefore before direct policy 
intervention on income – and the same index calculated on GDHI per head2. The latter takes 
into account direct policy intervention on income by means of positive elements such as 
social benefits received and other current transfers received (total secondary resources) and 
negative elements such as current taxes on income and wealth (e.g. income tax, council tax), 
social contributions paid (e.g. employees pension/social security contributions) and other 
current transfers paid (total secondary uses). Therefore, Policy is intended as a broad and 
regional version (by considering policy measures other than taxes) of the Reynolds and 
Smolensky (1977) index usually calculated to measure the progressiveness of tax systems. 
Clearly, this measure theoretically ranges between zero (reflecting total ineffectiveness of 
state intervention in reducing spatial disparities) and the value of the Gini index relative to 
primary income3 (reflecting the effectiveness of state intervention in reducing all spatial 
disparities characterising the distribution of primary income).   
Challenging methodological issues are involved in calculating measures able to 
capture the real degree of autonomy enjoyed by sub-national, regional and local levels of 
government (Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev 2009; Torrisi et al. 2010). Therefore, due to 
data constraints and the need for international comparability within a larger study, for 
decentralisation we adopted a standard and widely used measure of fiscal decentralization 
based on the local to total general government revenue ratio (Fiscal devolution) using data 
from Eurostat (Government Finance Statistics). This is a proxy for the devolution of fiscal 
powers and responsibilities to sub-national governments. We would stress that since our main 
intent (only partially pursued in this paper focusing on the UK case) is the international 
comparison of the simultaneous historical paths of spatial policy, spatial inequalities and 
devolution, our proxy for the latter represents an imperfect choice with respect to other 
alternative measures developed in the literature. Indeed, the alternative measure based on the 
expenditure side, even if available for all EU member states, is not relevant for our analysis 
given that the “share of local expenditure to total expenditure” is not statistically correlated 
with (our measure of) spatial disparities4. As for alternative measures explicitly taking into 
account institutional factors, such as Regional Authority Index developed by Marks et al. 
(2008) and different decentralisation factor scores proposed by Schneider (2003), although 
they try to capture devolution of policy and law making powers, they are time-invariant or at 
least they are characterised by a step chart and as a consequence are rather inappropriate for 
analysing historical paths. Therefore, given these data, measurement and commensurability 
constraints as well as the particular context of the UK’s highly centralised institutional 
                                                 
2 Per head values computed using ܵ௧
௝in both cases. 
3 This would imply a Gini index after state intervention equal to zero.  
4 The Spearman correlation index between Gini and the share of sub-national expenditure in total expenditure is 
equal to 0.3727 with a p-value of 0.0961.  
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setting, we are confident that our measure is the preferable one to the case at hand. Figure 3 
displays the historical evolution of the three variables introduced above in the UK.  
The evolution of the line representing the Gini coefficient in Figure 3 shows that 
regional disparities have tended to rise during the period of analysis and that their behaviour 
has been clearly affected by national business cycles. The period of the end of the 1980s 
Lawson boom witnessed a relatively steady increase in territorial inequality. But, as boom 
turned to bust in the early 1990s, regional disparities in the UK fell sharply, reaching their 
nadir in 1992. The economic recovery that ensued signalled a return to the growth in spatial 
disparities, which was particularly pronounced during the last two years of the Major 
government and during the first Blair term, peaking in 2001. Since then, and coinciding with 
the greater investment in public services of the second and third Labour administrations, 
spatial disparities have marginally declined (Table 3). This business-cycle-led evolution of 
disparities fits well with the sheltered-economy evolution of spatial disparity proposed by 
Rodríguez-Pose and Fratesi (2007): while the wealthier and more open regions of the South 
East of England experience to a greater extent than the rest of the UK the vagaries of the 
market, the increasing dependence of the poorer northern and western regions on non-market 
oriented services – as a consequence of the relative decline of their traditional industrial base 
– has made them more impervious to changes in market circumstances. This explains the 
tendency for UK nations and regions to diverge in periods of boom and to converge in 
periods of economic crisis (Martin 1993), as well as the longer-term trend towards rising 
spatial disparities. 
But, having established that the evolution of spatial disparities in the UK seems to be 
the result of the combination of market exposure and business cycles, to what extent has 
devolution played a role in this process? The fiscal devolution variable in Figure 3 illustrates 
the association between devolution and the evolution of spatial disparities may have been 
more than testimonial. Decreases in sub-national government autonomy in the late 1980s and 
in the mid- to late 1990s due to the abolition of Metropolitan Councils and the cutting of the 
rate support grant (Duncan and Goodwin 1988), coincide with significant increases in spatial 
disparity. By contrast, the apparent rise in fiscal devolution between 1989 and 1992 is 
associated with the biggest decline in spatial disparities (Figure 3)5. While establishing a 
cause-effect relationship between both phenomena is impossible just by looking at Figure 3, 
their coincidence in time may mean that even the limited fiscal devolution policies pursued 
by successive British governments in periods of boom and bust may have played a non-
negligible role in shaping spatial disparities. 
Regarding the relationship between the evolution of spatial economic policy and the 
evolution of regional disparities, the interaction of the lines points towards a situation 
whereby until 2003, at least, spatial economic policy reacts to – rather than shapes – changes 
in spatial disparity. The rise in disparities of 1988-1989 is followed by a rise in spatial policy 
intervention in subsequent years, while the decline in disparities of the early 1990s signals the 
effects of the national automatic stabilizers and a declining involvement in spatial policies. 
This policy trend is only redressed after 1996, when the evidence of spatial disparities rising 
anew becomes clear (Figure 3). Only after 2003 there seems to be a possibility of spatial 
economic policies shaping territorial disparities and not vice versa (Figure 3). But to what 
extent can we say that changes in spatial disparity are the result of a combination of national 
business cycles and variations in fiscal devolution and spatial policies? In order to investigate 
further the changing relations between spatial disparities, spatial economic policy and 
                                                 
5 We address the issue of the reliability of the devolution measure utilised in this analysis further in this section. 
At this stage both the “decrease in sub-national government autonomy” and the  “massive rise in fiscal 
devolution” should be interpreted as if (our measure of) Fiscal Devolution would be able to reflect real change 
in the central-local relationship. 
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decentralisation for the UK introduced above and to better discern which factors may be 
related to shifts in growth patterns, on the one hand, and to changes in policies, on the other, 
we also consider changes in national economic performance (Growth). The rationale here is 
that all the variables considered are linked with the economic performance of the system as a 
whole and that the relation between each and economic performance is not clear ex ante. As 
mentioned earlier, shifts in national economic growth – or changes in national business cycles 
– may be the primary force behind the trajectory of spatial disparities in the UK. Figure 4 
compares the evolution of economic performance and regional disparities for the UK for 
1984-2007. 
The analysis illustrates the close relationship between national economic performance 
and spatial disparities (Figure 4). With the exception of the most recent period (2005-2007), 
both lines tend to mimic one another, with rises and declines in national growth tending to be 
followed by similar rises and declines – albeit with different time lags depending on the 
period – in spatial disparities at the regional level (Figure 4). The dynamic of the relation 
between spatial disparities and national economic growth sheds some light on the varied and 
uneven nature of the relationship between spatial disparities and devolution and how it 
changes direction during specific time periods. Decomposing Fiscal devolution into its two 
main components, namely local revenue (Local revenue) and general government revenue 
(General revenue), there seems to be a mechanism linking spatial disparities and devolution 
with the national economic cycle. By including a one-year lagged growth rate (Lagged 
growth), Table 4 shows: (i) the presence of a negative correlation6, though statistically neutral 
at 5% significance level, between economic performance (Growth and Lagged growth), on 
the one hand, and the annual change in the local revenue (Change local revenue), on the 
other; and, (ii) a positive correlation between the former and the annual rate of total revenue 
change (Revenue change). This underlines that, in times of economic expansion with 
increased spatial disparities, the index of devolution – their ratio – has decreased and vice 
versa. This evidence could be explained in terms of the traditional automatic stabilising effect 
of central taxation with increases during the upturn (via income tax, VAT etc) and decline 
during recession, and the (statistically) neutral correlation between economic performance 
and local revenue generally protected during recession (see point (i) above).  
This analysis suggests that the critical causal relationship is between spatial disparities 
and national economic performance. Moreover, given the temporal lag in the relation 
between economic performance and other variables emerging from the analysis above, 
especially via total revenue (considering also that the correlation between its change and past 
change in economic performance is higher than the one with present economic performance, 
respectively 0.7370 and 0.5218), we hypothesise that economic performance could be the 
initiating factor and that other variables follow its movement with opposite dynamics and 
explanations. In other words, the interpretation of the empirical evidence of the relation 
between economic performance and spatial disparities is that – if not wholly driven by the 
business cycle – the evolution of regional disparities is strongly related to national economic 
performance, rather than the result of any ‘economic dividend’ of devolution. This analysis is 
based upon our chosen proxy for decentralisation which, while commonly used in the 
literature (Oates, 1985; Woller and Phillips, 1998; Akai and Sakata, 2002), is – as we have 
acknowledged – not without its weaknesses (Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev 2009). The 
direction of causality will, however, require further investigation and cross-national 
comparative study. Put differently, our analysis suggests that spatial disparities heavily 
depend upon national economic performance which, in turn, is strongly driven by 
                                                 
6 The results reported in Table 4 and 5 refer to the Pearson correlation index. However, when resorting to 
alternative indices, such as the Spearman's rank correlation coefficients, which allow for non-linear correlation, 
the magnitude and significance of the coefficients is, by and large, unchanged. 
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geographical concentration of economic activity in London and the Greater South East so that 
an eventual ‘dividend’ in terms of spatial disparities seems to searched in the national 
economic performance as delivered by London. In order to further investigate these 
arguments, we per perform an analysis on income polarisation across UK regions. Indeed, 
since Esteban and Ray (1994)’s seminal paper, it is well known that income inequality 
measures could be low even in the presence of a strong polarisation so it is worth analysing 
them separately. Although different indices of polarisation have been developed in the 
literature (Wolfson, 1994; Wang and Tsui, 2000 ; Chakravarty and Majumder, 2001), we 
adopt the widely used Generalised Esteban, Gardìn and Ray (2007) (EGR) polarisation index. 
Therefore, we apply to following formula to regional GDHI per head as defined above 
 
ܲாீோ ሺ݂, ߙ, ߩכ, ߚሻ
ൌ
1
2
ቌ෍ ෍ ݌௝
ଵାఈ݌௞ ቚߤ′௝ െ ߤ′௞ቚ െ ߚ ൫ܩሺ݂ሻ െ ܩሺߩ
כሻ൯
௠
௄ୀଵ
௠
௝ୀଵ
ቍ eq.(3) 
 
where  ߤ′௝ ൌ
ఓೕ
ఓ ௝
 and ݌௝denote respectively the (corrected) average income and the numerical 
weight of group j; ߙ א[1,1.6] is the parameter that captures the degree of sensitivity of our 
measure of polarisation, and ߚ ൒  0 is the parameter used to express the weight assigned to 
the error term  ൫ܩሺ݂ሻ െ ܩሺߩכሻ൯ in determining group composition (see Appendix 1 for 
details).   
Empirical results in the four-groups case – this choice being supported by previous 
studies on regional clusters (Rodríguez-Pose and Vilalta-Bufi 2005, Ezcurra 2009) – are 
shown in Figure 5. This figure, even with exceptions characterised by increasing spatial 
disparities linked with decreasing polarisation (in 1984-1985, to some extent in 1987-1988 
and during the economic recovery of 1992-1993) and vice versa (1986-1987, 1991-1992 and 
the relatively recent period 2004-2005), empirically confirms the positive correlation between 
spatial disparities and polarisation at the regional level in the UK during the whole 
period1994-2003 and the more recent upturn of both measures in 2005-2006 and downturn 
relative to 2006-2007. We interpret this close path involving regional disparities and regional 
polarisation, combined with the strong relation between the former and national economic 
performance discussed above, as a preliminary confirmation of the role played by the 
‘winning’ (Ezcurra 2009) region of London and the Greater South East in driving national 
economic performance and in determining its consequences on spatial disparities.      
A final step, building upon the analysis of economic growth and Fiscal devolution 
components, considers the correlations between variables in order to capture the whole set of 
overall relations between each other. Table 5 shows this correlation matrix. The correlations 
confirm and support the analysis above. Nonetheless, some points are worth stressing here. 
First, a rather counterintuitive positive overall correlation between spatial policy and spatial 
inequality (0.6201) is found. Indeed, given the formula used to calculate our measure of 
spatial economic policy (see Appendix 1), ceteris paribus, an increase in regional disparities 
(Gini index relative to GDHI) will result in a decrease in the measure of spatial economic 
policy. This is what empirically registered, for example, during the biennium 1984-1986 
with, as mentioned, increasing spatial disparities linked with a decrease in the measure of 
regional policy. However, our analysis confirms that, overall, disparities in (primary) income 
before state intervention rose more than disparities involving GDHI – i.e. once measures of 
policy operated – generating a positive correlation between the spatial policy and spatial 
disparities. Second, a negative overall correlation between decentralisation and spatial 
disparities (-0.4807) is confirmed. Fiscal decentralisation is likely to increase the degree of 
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efficiency in the allocation of resources which may give rise to a spatially even distribution of 
income. However, further consideration of national economic performance and spatial 
polarisation indicators – combined with the analysis of correlations reported in Table 4 – 
shows that this interpretation could be misleading. Indeed, considering the level and growth 
rate of national GDP, a strong correlation between spatial disparities, spatial polarisation and 
economic performance arises (for the former and GDP, Growth, and Lagged growth 
respectively 0.7844, 0.3905 and 0.4522, while, regarding polarisation, a correlation of 
0.7165, 0.331 and 0.4801 is registered with GDP, Growth and Lagged growth respectively). 
It is important too that the coefficient for Lagged growth is – statistically significant at 5% 
level – and slightly higher than the one for Growth (although not statistically significant at 
5%) in both cases confirming the existence of a temporal lag between both spatial disparities 
and polarisation and their correlation with national economic performance. Overall, the 
interpretation here sees the negative correlation between regional disparities and devolution 
as a spurious one that could be explained in terms of the positive correlation between spatial 
disparities, spatial polarisation, and national economic performance combined with the 
negative correlation between economic performance and the share of local revenue (-0.3538 
and -0.7517 respectively for Growth and Lagged growth). This evidence challenges the 
argument in favour of a “strong positive correlation between this measure of devolution and 
the downturn in regional per capita differentials” (Calamai 2009: 1140). In particular, the 
argument developed from analysis of the Italian case that “the upsurge in the devolutionary 
trend clearly precedes the reduction of regional disparities with a one-year time lag, shedding 
some light on the apparent direction of such (partial) association” (Calamai 2009: 1139), 
highlights the need for further investigation of the dynamic of the role played by economic 
growth and national growth poles.  
As a final robustness check, we test the hypothesis that the measures of devolution 
and spatial policy used in this paper, rather than being independent  from, have some 
potential mechanical dependence on the measure of spatial disparity.  In other words, (i) since 
we are correlating the Gini index for GDHI with a proxy of regional policy that also contains 
the Gini, one can doubt that a relationship between the two measure arises in the sense that, 
formally, for some ߙଵ ് 0 in the regression  
 
 ܱܲܮܫܥ ௧ܻ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵܩܫܰܫ௧ ൅ ݑ௧ eq.(4) 
 
the variable s୲ ൌ POLICY୲ െ  αଵGINI୲ is a process integrated of order zero (i.e. a I(0) process) 
meaning that the two series are cointegrated (Wooldridge, 2002). Furthermore, (ii) comparing 
the GINI index for GDHI with FISCDEV (i.e. an index of the ratio of local to central 
government fiscal revenues), it might be that the latter itself is dependent directly on inter-
regional income inequalities. Therefore, if this would be the case, for some βଵ ് 0, in the 
following regression  
 
 FISCDEV୲ ൌ β଴ ൅ βଵGINI୲ ൅ e୲   
eq. (5) 
 
the variable r୲ ൌ  FISCDEV୲ െ  αଵGINI୲ is I(0) meaning, also in this case, that the two series 
are cointegrated. If so, in our analysis, rather than comparing three distinct measures over 
time, we would – indirectly be observing simply the long-run relationship between one 
variable (GINI) and the remaining two. In order to address this issue we perform a 
cointegration test taking into consideration that the (potential) cointegration parameter is 
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unknown in both cases. Therefore, we apply augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test to the 
residuals of both regressions (uො୲, eො୲ሻ adopting critical values taken from Davidson and 
MacKinnon (1993). Table 6 shows results relative to this test where also lags of ∆uො୲ and ∆eො୲ 
are added to account for serial correlation. 
The results reported in Table 6 indicate that the unit root hypothesis can not be 
rejected in both regressions at 5% significance level. Hence, it can be argued that no 
statistically significant long-run relationship arises between GINI and other proxies of policy 
and devolution. Put differently, the relation between GINI and POLICY as well as the relation 
between GINI and FISCDEV “tell us nothing meaningful” (Wooldridge, 2002:588). More 
precisely, in terms of our analysis, these results have to be interpreted in the sense that the 
simultaneous consideration of the historical path of spatial disparity, spatial economic policy 
anddevolutionas separate variables is meaningful given that both spatial economic policy and 
fiscal devolution measures incorporate distinct information that can not be properly inferred 
from the simple consideration of regional inequality only. This evidence gives further 
empirical strength to results reported in this paper.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
More than a decade after the constitutional reforms of the late 1990s which brought 
devolution to parts of the UK, this article has sought to assess and reflect upon the evidence 
and enduring meaning of the ‘economic dividend’ of devolution in the UK. Acknowledging 
the difficulties and methodological challenges involved in seeking to discern such a complex, 
subtle and difficult to measure entity (Jeffery 2006), a multi-disciplinary and geographical 
political economy approach has been adopted. This study has sought to embed any 
relationships between decentralisation, spatial economic policy and changes in spatial 
disparities in their appropriate context of the unfolding histories of institutional, political and 
economic change over time and space within the particularity of the UK state. The UK’s 
highly centralised system has marked its particular evolution and established a constrained 
context for any ‘economic dividend’ to emerge. This contrasts the more substantive and 
extensive fiscal decentralisation in other countries which have experienced stronger, more 
widespread, positive effects under certain conditions (Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra 2010). 
The analysis has revealed a number of interesting points. First is the varied and 
uneven nature of the relationship between spatial disparities, spatial economic policy and 
fiscal devolution in the UK, with important changes in direction during the period under 
analysis. Second, the role of national economic growth is pivotal in explaining the evolution 
of spatial disparities and the nature and extent of their relationship with the particular forms 
of spatial economic policy and decentralisation deployed. The dominance of national 
economic growth within the current forms of more growth-oriented forms of spatial 
economic policy has reinforced its decisive explanatory role, underlining the emergent trade-
off between national economic growth and politically tolerable levels of spatial disparities 
(Martin 2008).  
Last, there was limited evidence that any ‘economic dividend’ of devolution has 
emerged yet but this remains difficult to discern because its likely effects are over-ridden by 
the role of national economic growth in decisively shaping the pattern of spatial disparities 
and in determining the scope and effects of spatial economic policy and decentralisation. 
Given the central importance of the geographical concentration of growth in London and the 
Greater South East to national economic growth and the role of state policy and investment in 
seeking to accommodate its contradictions (Pike and Tomaney 2010), this ‘super-region’ 
(Birch et al. 2009) could be interpreted as the principal beneficiary of the turn to a more 
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growth-oriented spatial economic policy and the modest decentralisation evident within the 
devolved arrangements in the English regions. The advancement of the interests of an already 
prosperous albeit highly unequal region sits uneasily with the ways in which the ‘economic 
dividend’ of devolution was promoted as a means to address the ‘economic deficit’ and 
ameliorate the marked spatial disparities between the nations and regions within the UK. This 
concern chimes with anxiety amongst commentators and government evident in the mid-
2000s: “In the unlikely event that devolution yields a uniform economic dividend in each 
region, the result does nothing to redress the territorial inequalities at the heart of the North-
South divide. Treating unequals equally is not a recipe for territorial justice” (Morgan 2006: 
3; see also House of Commons 2003). 
Our findings lead us to conclude that even when it might be discerned, any ‘economic 
dividend’ of devolution is likely to be highly variable, taking different forms and degrees, and 
may be episodic or fleeting in its duration. It appears highly contingent upon particular paths 
of state institutional change across a range of scales and to be strongly shaped by national 
economic growth, the nature of fiscal autonomy and capacity and willingness for 
redistribution on the part of national central states. We acknowledge, however, that it might 
be that the timescale of our assessment may be too foreshortened and that much more than a 
decade needs to elapse before the effects of any ‘economic dividend’ become more apparent. 
In addition, improvements are needed in data availability and methodological development to 
help create further proxies and indicators.  
Amidst the territorial politics of the UK’s nations and regions, contestation over the 
existence, nature and scale of any ‘dividends’ associated with devolution continue to unfold, 
further stoked by the emergence of a Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government in 
2010. The uneven ways in which devolution has been unfurled across the UK’s polycentric 
political economy continues to generate political controversy. In 2010, for example, a 
Scotland Office review found that 1999 public expenditure in Scotland by both the central 
and devolved administration exceeded the total revenue raised from across Scotland by 
£75.8bn. This led the then Scottish Secretary Jim Murphy to claim that “Scotland has two 
governments spending billions of pounds of public money and there is a clear and 
quantifiable ‘devolution dividend’. Scotland gets the best of both worlds from devolution” 
amidst protests from the Scottish National Party that the figures were inaccurate. The 
continued relevance of this concern with the economic and indeed other dividends of 
devolution warrants further studies, especially international comparative work.  
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Table 1: Redistributive, free-market and growth-oriented spatial economic policy 
 
Characteristic Redistributive Free-market Growth-oriented 
Economic theory Keynesian growth 
theory 
Neo-classical 
(exogenous) 
growth theory 
New (endogenous) 
growth theory 
Causal explanation 
of spatial 
disparities 
Low aggregate 
demand and 
investment, 
structural 
weaknesses 
Inherited factor 
endowments and 
quality, 
inflexibility and 
immobility in 
factor markets 
Constructed factor 
endowments and 
increasing returns 
generating 
productivity and 
innovation 
differentials 
Adjustment process Spatial disparities 
persist through 
cumulative 
causation, 
multiplier, spread 
and backwash 
effects 
Factor market 
adjustment returns 
to equilibrium and 
convergence 
reduces spatial 
disparities 
Agglomeration and 
spill-over effects, 
national growth and 
spatial disparity trade-
off  
Policy rationales Redistribution for 
economic 
efficiency and 
spatial and social 
equity and balance 
Improving factor 
market efficiency, 
flexibility and 
mobility 
Market failures or 
equity 
Policy instruments Automatic capital 
and labour 
subsidies, industrial 
development 
controls, 
infrastructure 
investment 
Regional Selective 
Assistance, 
enterprise grants 
for SMEs and new 
start-ups 
Innovation grants, 
Venture capital funds 
Institutional 
organisation 
Centralised, 
national 
Centralised, 
national 
Decentralised, sub-
national, regional, 
city(-regional) and/or 
local 
Geographical focus 
and scope 
Regional Regional, local and 
urban 
City(-regional) 
Political-economic 
project 
Social Democratic New Right, Neo-
liberal 
Third Way, Neo-
liberal 
Language Regional 
inequalities, 
redistribution 
Regional and local 
divides, trickle-
down 
Spatial disparities, 
performance gaps 
spill-overs 
Source: Authors’ research. 
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Table 2: Types of decentralisation 
 
Fiscal Political Administrative Deconcentration Delegation Devolution 
Central  
governments  
ceding fiscal autonomy
to non-central 
government entities 
Degree to  
which central 
government allows 
non-central 
government entities 
to undertake the 
political functions of 
governance; degree 
to which political 
actors and issues are 
significant at the 
local level and are at 
least partially 
independent from 
those at the national 
level 
How much autonomy 
non-central 
government entities 
posses relative to 
central control 
Central government 
that disperses 
responsibility for a 
policy to its field 
offices; powers are 
transferred to lower-
level actors who are 
accountable to their 
superiors in a 
hierarchy 
Transfer of policy 
responsibility to 
local government or 
semi autonomous 
organizations that 
are not controlled 
by the central 
government but 
remain accountable 
to it  
Central government allows 
quasi-autonomous local 
units of government to 
exercise power and control 
over the transferred policy 
Source: Adapted from Torrisi et al. (2010). 
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Table 3: Potential economic benefits and costs of devolution  
 
Potential Benefits 
 
Potential Costs 
Devolved policies better reflect territorial 
preferences (Allocative efficiencies) 
 
Additional administrative costs of 
additional layers of government and/or 
governance institutions 
  
Improved knowledge of territorial 
economic potential (Productive 
efficiencies) 
Loss of scale economies in policy 
formulation and delivery 
 
Increased ‘rent-seeking’ by interest 
groups better able to influence sub-
national territorial rather than national 
institutions 
 
Democratic accountability improves 
efficiency of policy formulation and 
implementation, fosters innovation  
 
Weaker disciplines of monitoring and 
evaluation (National finance ministries as 
tougher drivers of efficiency than 
territorial institutions) 
  
Fiscal autonomy provides hard budget 
constraints and (where applicable) tax-
varying power allows marginal changes 
to taxation and spending  
Budget constraints increasingly tied to 
territorial fiscal capacity 
 
Weak incentives due to lack of 
mechanism linking public spending with 
tax revenues raised within sub-national 
territories  
 
Lower coordination and compliance 
costs vis-à-vis rest of the national 
territory  
Reduced coordination with the rest of the 
national territory with possible negative 
spill-over effects both on and from sub-
national territories  
 
Source: Adapted from Ashcroft et al. (2005: 3). 
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Figure 1: GVA per head by region and nation, 1968-2005 
 
 
Source: Calculated from ONS. 
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Figure 2: Expenditure on Regional Industrial Assistance, 1960-2002 
Source: Wren (2005) (Figures are for actual grant payments at constant prices for Great Britain). 
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Figure 3: Evolution of spatial disparities, spatial economic policy and decentralisation 
 
 
Fiscal Decentralisation:  share of local revenue on total government revenue; Gini index: Gini 
index of regional Gross Disposable Household Income per head (GDHI); Policy: Gini index of 
regional primary household income and Gini index of GDHI.  For further details see Appendix. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on data from ONS. 
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Figure 4: Evolution of spatial disparities and national economic performance 
 
 
Gini index: Gini index of regional Gross Disposable Household Income per head (GDHI); 
Growth: annual growth rate of national Gross Domestic Product. For further details see 
Appendix.  
Source: Authors’ elaboration on data from ONS and Eurostat. 
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Figure 5: Evolution of spatial disparities and spatial polarisation 
 
 
Gini index: Gini index of regional Gross Disposable Household Income per head (GDHI); 
EGR index: generalised measure of income polarization (n= 4, δ=1.6, λ= 1). For further details 
see Appendix.   
Source: Authors’ elaboration on data from ONS. 
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Table 4: Pearson correlation between national economic performance and component of 
devolution index 
 
 Growth  Lagged 
growth 
Revenue change Change local 
revenue 
     
Growth 1    
 
Lagged growth 
 
0.6382* 
 
1 
  
 
Revenue change 
 
 
0.4951* 
 
 
0.7041* 
 
 
1 
 
 
Change local 
revenue 
 
 
-0.3614 
 
 
-0.1728 
 
 
-0.1751 
 
 
1 
* significant at 5% 
Growth: annual growth rate of national Gross Domestic Product; Lagged Growth: one-year-
lagged annual growth rate of national Gross Domestic Product; Revenue change: annual 
change rate of General Government revenue; Change local revenue: annual change rate of 
Local revenue. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on data from ONS and Eurostat. 
 
 
Table 5: Pearson correlation between regional disparities, national economic 
performance, devolution and spatial economic policy 
 
 Gini GDP Growth Lagged growth 
Fiscal 
decentraisation 
Polic
y 
GiniI 1      
GDP  0.7822* 1     
Growth 0.3226 0.0029 1    
Lagged growth  0.4581* 0.0303 
  
0.6382
* 
1   
Fiscal 
decentraisation 
-
0.4888* 0.0822 -0.3538  -0.7517* 1  
Policy  0.5865* 
 
0.9148* -0.2311 -0.2372 0.2767 1 
Polarisation index  0.9561* 
 
0.7165* 
  
0.3301   0.4801* -0.5197* 1 
*significant at 5% 
Gini index:  Gini index of regional Gross Disposable Household Income per head (GDHI); 
GDP: Gross Domestic Product; Growth: annual growth rate of national Gross Domestic 
Product; Lagged Growth: one-year-lagged annual growth rate of national Gross Domestic 
Product; Fiscal Decentralisation: share of local revenue on total government revenue; Policy: 
Gini index of regional primary household income and Gini index of GDHI.  For further details 
see Appendix.   
Source: Authors’ elaboration on data from ONS and Eurostat. 
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Table 6: Cointegration test between spatial inequality and measures of spatial policy and 
fiscal devolution. 
 
ADF 
 No Lags Lag (1) Lag (2) Lag (3) Lag (4) 
 
POLICY 
 
-1.538 
(0.5148)
 
-2.294 
(0.1739)
 
-1.970 
(0.3000)
 
-2.610 
(0.0910)
 
-2.027 
(0.2750) 
 
FISCDEV -1.794 
(0.3834)
-2.230 
(0.1956)
-2.475 
(0.1217)
-2.668 
(0.0797)
-2.674 
(0.0786) 
Note: the Table reports results of Augmented Dickey-Fuller test on residuals of regression 4 
and 5. Therefore, names of variables reported in the Table must be interpreted in the sense that 
relative results refer to the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test on residuals generated by the 
regression having each variable as explicative variable.  Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) 
approximate p-values are reported in parenthesis. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
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Appendix 
 
Welfare distribution can be measured and analysed according to several complementary 
perspectives. The simplest way to deal with this issue is represented by (i) personal welfare 
distribution which refers to analyses on individual welfare distribution considering the 
economy as a whole. A second perspective focuses on (ii) functional welfare distribution 
referring to welfare distribution among production factors such as “capital” and “labour”. 
Moreover, moving from the consideration that different “social classes” (e.g. workers and 
capitalist) could participate in different way to production (for example, workers can offer 
also capital), analyses could additionally refer to the (iii) social distribution of welfare in 
order to investigate how welfare is distributed among social classes. A further perspective is 
based on (iv) sectorial welfare distribution, i.e. on how welfare is distributed among 
economic sectors (e.g. agriculture and industry). Other analyses investigate, as this paper 
does, how welfare is distributed among geographical areas belonging to the economic system, 
concentrating their scope to the (v) spatial welfare distribution.  
Regardless of the perspective(s) two preliminary issues involve the elaboration of 
distributive indices: the choice of the variable and the choice of the unit of analysis. 
Regarding the first issue (variable) should be noted that in addition to the widespread used 
“income” other indicators could be considered to analyse “welfare” distribution. For 
example, measures of consumption or wealth could be used achieving presumably contrasting 
results. Indeed, since the propensity to consume is decreasing with respect to income, it is 
reasonable that the distribution of consume will be, ceteris paribus, more equally distributed 
than the income’s one. In a rather specular way, wealth will be less equally distributed than 
income, given that “save” and “accumulation” are increasing with respect to income.  As for 
the second issue,  in addition to the simplest unit of analysis represented by “individuals” 
(generating income per capita), household income could be considered, basing the analysis 
on the argument that “households” are the locus where economic decisions take place 
according to total amount of resources available to each household as a whole. Although the 
household appears to be the most appropriate unit of analysis, it rise the need for taking into 
account economies of scale in consumption depending on household size and composition. In 
other words, the needs of a household grow with each additional member but not in a 
proportional way. For example, needs for heating and electricity will not be three times as 
high for a household with three members than for a single person. Equivalence scales (for a 
review see Atkinson et al. (1995)) are the statistical tool used to deal with this issue in order 
to obtain comparable units such as families made up of equivalent-adults. 
According to arguments mentioned above this paper considers income as variable of 
interest and households as unit of reference in order to analyse the spatial income distribution 
across UK regions. More precisely, the regional (NUTS 1 level) Gross Disposable Household 
Income (GDHI) is considered. More precisely: the “household sector” covers people living in 
traditional households as well as those living in institutions, such as retirement homes and 
prisons (this sector also includes sole trader enterprises and non-profit institutions serving 
households such as charities and most universities) and “gross disposable (household) 
income” is derived from the balances of primary and secondary income. In turn, the balance 
of primary income is the difference between total primary resources and uses while the 
balance of secondary income is derived from total secondary resources less uses. In short, 
household income represents the amount of money available to households after taxes, 
National Insurance, pension contributions and interest have been paid. Table A.1 below 
illustrates the computation of GDHI and details of its main components. 
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Table A.1 – Computation and main components of GDHI 
 
Aggregate                                                                                            Description 
 
BALANCE OF PRIMARY INCOME 
  
Total Primary Resources TPR: Compensation of employees (all 
income from employment), operating 
surplus mainly rental, imputed or 
otherwise, in the household sector), mixed 
income (income from self-employment) 
and property income received. 
 
Total Primary Uses TPU: property income paid. 
 
Balance of Primary Income BPI = TPR-TPU 
 
BALANCE OF SECONDARY INCOME 
 
Total Secondary Resources TSR: social benefits received, other 
current transfers received (financial gifts, 
non-life insurance claims etc.). 
 
Total Secondary Uses TSU: current taxes on income and wealth 
(income tax, council tax), social 
contributions paid (employees pension / 
social security contributions), other current 
transfers paid. 
 
Balance of Secondary Income BSI = TSR-TSU 
 
GROSS DISPOSABLE HOUSEHOLD INCOME 
 
Gross Disposable Household Income GDHI = BPI + BSI  
Source: Authors’ elaboration on ONS (2009, p. 9). 
 
Given the aggregate nature of data regarding GDHI it is not possible disentangling 
data at single household level in order to correct for household composition1. However, to 
take into account this issue, in computing per head values, a sort of modified  “OECD 
equivalence scale” has been applied to original aggregate data on GDHI.  The procedure has 
been implemented as follows. Total population of each region  has been divided into six 
different classes ( ) according to their composition and size2 applying the following formula 
in order to estimate the numeric weight of each class3 
                                                 
1 This would involve dividing the income of each household by the number of household member corrected by  
scale factor. For example Coulter et al. (1992) proposed to divide household income by , where Nh is the 
number of household members  and θ  [0,1] is the parameter used to capture the scale economies. 
2 For classes description see following table A.2. 
3 It is worth noticing that eq. A.1 leaves the total population unchanged, in the sense that the following equation 
holds .  
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where, as already said,  represents the estimation of the number of people of region “j” 
living in families of type “i” at time “t”; is the total population at time “t” in region “j”;  
represents each of eight household sizes considered, and  represents the percentage of each 
type of household type in total household of region “j”4. Therefore, regional differences in 
families’ composition are captured mainly by mean of  . 
Before describing next step, it is worth noticing that as a result of the application of 
any equivalence scale, only a fraction of the original number of household’s member ( ) is 
considered. More precisely, only the fraction  
 
                                       
 
is considered, where M   represents the number of components’ types of the household 
(elderly people, adults, children…),  is the relative weight given to them and   [0,1] 
represents the economies of scale within the household. Clearly,  represents the numerical 
weight of each member class inside the household  
For example, let us consider the simple case in which per capita income is corrected 
applying the following formula (A.3) representing a sub-case of previous equation A.2 
obtained posing  for each type of household member 
                                                                    
 
 
where  represents per capita (corrected) household income,  represents total household 
income, and   , as mentioned, is  the number of household members corrected by θ to 
capture the scale economies. In this case only the fraction  
                  
 
 
of household’s member is considered. As further numeric example consider that - posing θ 
equal to 0,5 - in the case of a household composed by 3 members only the fraction  
 would be considered in order to compute its per capita income.  
Clearly, the discourse could be extended to k families of the same type: of the total of 
 people involved, only the fraction 
                                                 
4Data on refers to 2008/2009 which, to the best of our knowledge, is the only datum available at present. 
Rigorously the condition  ?+,  should be verified. However, for computational difficulties, the more 
general condition ,  is assumed.   
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would be considered5. 
Therefore, it is possible to calculate the fraction of household’s member considered 
when the OECD equivalence scale is utilised according to different household composition. 
Indeed, this scale allows for three degrees of differentiation assigning, for each household, a 
value of 1 to the first household member, of 0.7 to each additional adult and of 0.5 to each 
child.  
Table A.2 below reports the ratio between household members considered and 
effective number of people of the household – i.e. a different measure of   in terms of 
framework developed above - for each of eight household types considered in this work. 
 
Table A.2 – Household type and share of household size considered according to the 
OECD          equivalence scale 
 
Household type* 
 1 adult without children 1 
 2 adults without children 0,85 
 3 or more adults without children 0,8 
 1 adult with children 0,75 
 2 adults with 1 child 0,73 
 2 adults with 2 children 0,68 
 2 adults with 3 or more children 0,62 
 3 or more adults with children 0,65 
*for computational purpose open intervals have been set as follows: “3 or more adults 
without children” as 3 adults;  “2 adults with 3 or more children” as 2 adults with 4 
children; “3 or more adults with children” as 3 adults and 3 children. 
 
Therefore, to each population class ( ) can be applied the correspondent correction 
factor  in order to obtain the respective household size corrected for household size and 
composition ( ) by applying the formula 
 
                                                        
 
 
Once obtained measures of , the aggregate datum computed according to the following 
formula    
 
               
 
 
                                                 
5 Clearly, the k values of H will depend also on the series of k values of Y. 
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can be used to compute GDHI per head values that – to same extent - take into account  
differences in household size and composition across regions. Hence, the following formula 
consisting in the ration between aggregate income earned by households resident in region j 
( )6 and a measure of aggregate population ( ) taking into account, as said, differences in 
household size and composition across regions   
 
 
 
has been applied in order to compute per head values of GDHI in region “j” ( ). The final 
step consisted in computing the Gini index of  across the “R” regions, by year, according 
to the formula 
 
                                                         
 
 
 
where  and , with  (i.e. is non-decreasing ordered)7.  
 
As for the measure of “Spatial Policy”, it was obtained by calculating first per head 
values (PI) of BPI (see Table A.1) according to the formula 
 
 
 
 
Then calculating the Gini index of PI according to the formula 
 
                                                         
 
 
 
Where, with time indices omitted,   and  , with . 
 
Finally,  the variable “spatial policy” has been obtained as 
 
                                                          
 
 
                                                 
6 Data on single household’s income are not available for the period considered in this analysis, therefore using 
aggregate data, rather than being an analyst’s choice, represents an “external data constraint” of the analysis.  
7 Time indices omitted for easier notation. 
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As for the measure of polarisation, it was used the Generalised Esteban, Gardin and 
Ray (2007) polarisation index (EGR). Indeed, this measure builds on the Esteban and Ray 
(1994) polarisation index that involves the division of the original population into a small 
number of significant homogeneous groups -  - (within-homogeneity condition) in order to 
achieve a high degree of heterogeneity across groups. Following the methodology proposed 
by Aghevli and Mehran (1981) and Davies and Shorrocks (1989) we determined the optimal 
partition of the distribution in a given number (m) of groups (ρ*). However, in so doing an 
“error” term arise in the measurement of dispersion with respect to the original distribution of 
income ( ) because of the consideration only of the disparity across group – ( ). 
This circumstance raised the the opportunity to correct the original measure reported below 
  
 
  
where  and denote respectively the average income and the numerical weight of group j; 
 ?[1,1.6] is the parameter that captures the degree of sensitivity of our measure of 
polarisation.  
Therefore, the measure of generalised polarisation proposed by Esteban et al. (2007), 
is given by the following  
 
 
 
where  is the parameter used to express the weight assigned to the error term  
 coming from groups division. Furthermore, to respect the scale invariance 
principle, we divide beforehand all incomes by the average income - i.e.  - and we 
divide the index by the scalar 2 to make its interval between 0 and 1 when the parameter α is 
equal to1.   
In our empirical exercise, adopting a four groups division, we fixed parameters  and 
 as follows. The parameter  has been settled equal to its upper bound (1,6) in order to 
emphasise the conceptual difference between distribution measures (Gini) and the 
polarization measure we adopted; the parameter  has been settled equal to 1. Indeed  given 
that the EGR indexes has the Gini coefficients as a reference in both its terms, It would be 
reasonable, in terms of scale, to set a statistical value equal to the unit (Duro, 2005). 
Therefore the formula we used is 
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